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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

NATION ASSISTANCE, CHARITY OR INVESTMENT?

BY

COLONEL CORTEZ DIAL United States Army

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Nation Assistance, Charity or Investment?

by

Cortez Dial

Dr. Craig Nation Project Advisor

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Cortez Dial

TITLE: Nation Assistance, Charity or Investment?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 1 April 1998 PAGES: 46 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Even though we are in the post-cold war era, the U.S. still finds itself constantly bombarded with requests for foreign assistance to include: humanitarian aid, financial aid, political intervention, and the physical presence of military forces to ward off would be aggressors. This aid, or assistance is called Nation Assistance. It is paramount that all participating parties be aware of the five imperatives covered by this paper as it addresses the issue of nation assistance and U.S. involvement. These five imperatives are:

- 1. The need for the U.S. to remain at the forefront as provider of nation assistance.
- 2. The need to identify and clarify roles of participating nation assistance agencies.
- 3. The need for a structured format for prioritizing nation assistance request and voluntary actions as either short term charity or as a long term investment.
- 4. The need for full participation and commitment of the host nation.
- 5. The need to clearly delineate circumstances and conditions of deployment, duration of involvement, use of force and specific responsibilities of U.S. armed forces.

When these imperatives are recognized and addressed, all parties can direct their joint energies toward nation assistance whether it is charity or investment.

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PREFACE

The U.S. is a super power which is dedicated morally and economically to nation assistance. Constantly coming to the rescue of nations in need, the U.S. has provided both long-term and short-term assistance. Historically, this assistance included broad-based economic assistance, environmental assistance during disasters, population and health issues, political intervention, and the spread of democracy.

Unfortunately, and too often, in the past, the generous and varied assistance provided by the U.S. and its many support agencies was either accepted as a short-term charitable fix, or viewed as a selfish act clocked with ulterior motives and hidden agendas. In this post-Cold War era nation assistance must be viewed as an investment by both the recipient and the U.S. agencies providing that assistance. This is to include, but is not limited to, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Peace Corps, United States Aid To International Development (USAID), the United Nations (UN), the State Department, Congress and the National command Authority.

It is paramount that all parties carefully analyze and review the goals and objectives of nation assistance. Basic to understanding and meeting those ideals are the urgent questions of why, who, what, when, and how. Why have we verbally committed to assist; which agencies and how much (man-power, and dollars)

are we willing to provide; what specifically are we prepared to do and in what time frame and order; when do we depart and when do we return; and finally, how do we use this opportunity as an instrument of peace, growth, stability, and as a way to promote and publicize good-will in the hearts and minds of nations seeking assistance?

We must also ask how this assistance will shape the international environment in support of U.S. vital interest and national security strategy.

This work and its contents is set to call attention to the need for all concerned to thoroughly ponder exactly what it is that they expect to garner from Nation Assistance. Attitude and expectations are key elements here. Exactly how will the U.S. and the host nation view the timed response and the actual assistance provided? Is it to be a short-term quick fix, a charitable handout, or is it a long-term investment and hand-up?

I propose in this work that our attitude and intent not be suspect. We must first, and far most, listen to the will of the people.

In this fascinating world of micro-chip technology, 24 hour news, a global economy and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, America stands alone in the position of super power. This position carries with it the moral weight of Atlas while simultaneously highlighting the reality of our limited strength and resources. One of the pillars of strength America uses to support the National Security Strategy (NSS) of Engagement and Enlargement is Nation Assistance. By definition Nation Assistance is "military assistance provided to a sovereign nation within its territorial borders based on mutual treaties or agreements". The goal of this program is to return or promote long-term stability, sustain growth and economic development of the host nation's infrastructure and institutions while eliminating the undue hardship and suffering of the host population.

Almost 40 years ago, President John F. Kennedy said that "foreign aid (nation assistance) is to be used to advance our national security interests and to further the cause of freedom around the world". That basic purpose remains valid today. What has changed, and changed drastically are the volatile, ambiguous, and uncertain conditions of the world we live in. Thus, the challenge is to change how we define our vital national interest and objectives in this new environment of regional conflicts, Soviet reform, and an inter-related global economy.

The United States has always come to the rescue of people and nations in need. From the effort to rebuild Europe after World War II to the feeding programs in Africa today, the generosity of America is unparalleled. Nation Assistance is one of the main elements used in shaping this new environment in an effort to achieve our national security strategy. So it comes as no surprise to learn that our assistance is aimed at existing, emerging, and potential democracies, while protecting our vital interest and increasing the opportunity to expand exports, establish, and open free market economies with new trading partners. When applied effectively with other tools used to shape the environment, nation assistance can reduce the need for longterm military deployments and intervention by helping to solve problems before they become a crisis. For example, our assistance in Latin America has produced stable democracies, with growing economies in the countries of Venezuela and Costa Rica.

Today our nation assistance focuses on four key elements of sustainable development: "broad-based economical growth, the environment, population and health, and democracy. We will also continue to strongly encourage private investment and NGO funding that is environmentally sound and that produces sustainable development".

ANALYSIS

Nation Assistance encompasses the use of diverse agencies ranging from the armed forces to the peace corp. The Agency for International Development (USAID) is the most comprehensive and it funds our bilateral economic programs which pays for everything from medicine to bricks. Some of the other major contributors are:

- Our contributions to the international financial institutions, and international debt reduction programs administered by the Treasury Department,
- Refugee assistance, voluntary contributions to the UN specialized agencies, international antinarcotics efforts, and international anti-terrorism activities administered by The State Department,
- Military assistance grants, loans, and loan guarantees, military education and training, and related programs administered by The Defense Security Assistance Agency,
- Trade promotion and export assistance programs administered by the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, The Trade and Development Agency, and others.⁴

In addition to the above list, many other agencies have direct appropriations outside of USAID which contribute immeasurably to the nation assistance effort—agencies such as the humanitarian assistance program of The Department Of Defense. "In all there are over 20 departments and AID (400 organizational units) attempting to accomplish 39 objectives imposed by congress and the executive branch." This is an impossible task, a duplication of effort, and a waste of resources in a time of budgetary restraints.

In the post Cold-War environment nation assistance can not be confused with charity. Rather it must be an investment in peace, growth, stability and must produce **results** the American people (the bill-payer)can see. Taiwan's booming economy and stable government is a great example of what nation assistance can accomplish.

The methods for assisting nations are as different as the countries themselves. It is in this area where we must reform our policy and promote and publicize good-will in the hearts and minds of nations looking for new direction. We must continue to mobilize international economic, political and humanitarian resources to lift countries in need toward a better way of life. This is working in Haiti, Guatemala, Paraguay and I believe many other emerging democracies are eager to join their ranks if given the right assistance and long-term commitment to succeed.

Clearly, our objective is to shape the international environment in support of U.S. vital interest and global security. What is not clear is just what the U.S. vital interest really are. Assistance given to dictators, corrupt rulers, and incompetent governments only confuses people of emerging nations and often destroys America's credibility. Nicaragua and Iran are but two examples. We can not make these mistakes again.

Ours must be a clear vision. It must be clear not only to us but to all of the participants in the assistance process. We must not compromise our values and standards. Increasingly, we have

tried to be all things to all people. We must make the hard choices, set priorities, then stick to them. We have limited time and resources; we need to coordinate with other contributors to avoid duplication and concentrate on what we do best-developing and sustaining free market economies.

THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

The fall of the Soviet Union and the other repressive regimes has been a huge success politically and is believed to have produced a realignment of thinking and resources called the peace dividend. The current assessment of the new world alignment of power is one which calls for a smaller DOD, no central opponent, more humanitarian missions, and a question of where is the savings the peace dividend was suppose to produce? In short, who are the enemies and what is the threat?

While we can agree, debate or disagree on these issues, the fact remains that operations like Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti are becoming the norm rather than the exception. Today, we are involved in Bosnia. Just months ago the National Command Authority (NCA) announced that US forces and support will not leave Bosnia in June 1998 as originally stated. Instead, we will remain in the region until it is stable. Although the Middle East, Bosnia, Iraq, Iran and Africa get most of the news coverage, the best examples of non-traditional threats and missions of the military are found in Latin America. Today the

threats of poverty, disease, ignorance, and repression will not be solved with bullets or tanks. Force may put a Band-Aid on the symptom but the causes are much deeper and require the gift of hope and joint commitment to produce a cure.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, we have witnessed peace in Nicaragua and El Salvador, economic maturity in select areas in Central and South America and the continuous disintegration of the infrastructure of the Castro regime in Cuba. Unlike the past when we did not fully appreciate the value of our southern neighbors, today there is a new sprit of governmental cooperation, economic opportunity and the realization of how closely linked our trade success and National Security are to each other. This is a litmus test to determine the approach the NCA must take in deciding to provide nation assistance and whether it will be charity or an investment.

NATION ASSISTANCE: CHARITY OR INVESTMENT?

What is the limit of the world's only super power? Can we police the world? Can we insure the world and underwrite its disasters? Can we feed the world's hungry and provide medical care to its needy? When do we decide to go in, and how long do we stay? In short I submit the decision is a delicate one and must be made after considering all of the elements of the NSS and long term benefit. We must also examine the amount of sacrifice we are asking the American people to make. At the same time, we must ask

and answer the question: what is the objective of assistance? Is it charity or investment?

Charity is usually very short-term, relatively inexpensive and used to eliminate massive suffering that our moral conscience compels us to solve. The relief provided to India after their earthquake in the early 1990s is an example of charity.

Investment is a long term commitment, costly in nature, involving a partnership between us and the host nation to strengthen democratic institutions, improve and expand their economies, rebuild the infrastructure and prepare the host nation for self-sufficiency. Investment should yield a profitable return. Whether it is in resources, alliances, business or the spread of democracy, the cost of commitment is so high it must produce a positive return thus strengthening our NSS.

Stability results from a government's ability to build and sustain the basic needs of the population, its ability to cultivate a sound market economy and its ability to defend its territorial borders.

Nation assistance programs support the host nation's own development programs, usually coordinated by the U.S. Ambassador.

These programs include the combined efforts of all of the key agencies under the lead of the State Department and are particularly tailored for specific situations. The contribution of DOD is usually security assistance, foreign internal defense assistance, humanitarian assistance and civic assistance. "We are

able to provide this assistance under the provisions of Title 10 of the U.S. Code which governs the operations of the armed forces." 6

In the past, many of our efforts have been half hearted, uncoordinated, greedy in nature, and thus not productive.

Insufficient training for rebuilding sensitive political, economic, educational, and social infrastructures, and the "make them like Americans" mentality contributed significantly to our minimal success.

OPTIONS

Diplomacy (ways) is our primary instrument to open an inviting door toward democracy and free-market economies in this post-Cold war period of uncertainty. The State Department and the United Nations are the two primary agencies we use for shaping the world environment and moving in the direction of peace, growth, stability, and open markets; and it is here where the stage is set for reform.

Whenever diplomatically possible, we must operate in coalitions to accomplish specific objectives we are not able to, or are unwilling to, pay the price to accomplish alone. As the only world super power, I think we are more successful shaping the environment when other nations are involved and the effort is sanctioned by the United Nations or other international organizations. This helps clarify our true position of

cooperation and benevolence, rather than the greedy and obnoxious ugly American our detractors paint us out to be. No doubt, actions speak louder to our cause than speeches or ceremonies. "Therefore we must continue our full participation in NATO, APEC, Partnership for Peace, and forums with our neighbors all around the world to promote peace, stability and open markets for trade".

No doubt the previously established good will in the UN and specifically our membership on the Security Council was vital to organizing the multi-national coalitions that participated in the Gulf War.

Restoring democracy in Haiti, and condemning the Cuban shoot-down of two civilian aircraft are more recent examples of cooperation at work in the UN. These examples of multi-national actions were accomplished largely by escaping the watchful eye of an ungrateful Congress. However, these are giant steps in shaping the environment, seen, or unseen. In the international arena we must seek, and find a global consensus of fair and unfair (if not right and wrong). This consensus was clearly demonstrated by the economic sanctions imposed against Iraq at the end of the Gulf War. Sending such a message to aggressive states is critical to stability and security in the world and shows the resolve of the UN (not just the US) to protect smaller nations from aggressors. In this role, the UN is vital as a world center for discussion

and action to protect world order, peace and the exchange of ideas.

Although I believe we derive the most long lasting benefit from acting in concert with our allies, it is imperative that we not be shackled by bureaucracy which would prevent quick and decisive action when needed to protect American interest. Thus, in our strategic plan we must use both bilateral and unilateral ways to accomplish our objective. The record is clear, positive change is being made both because of our collaborative diplomatic efforts in the UN and also because of our own solo efforts. By shaping the environment and by relieving human suffering and improving the long-term quality of life for emerging nations, we are also protecting our own vital interest and spreading democracy.

The President's position is that "positive military cooperation often serves to build security relationships today in an effort to keep these countries from becoming adversaries tomorrow."

More and more the record has proven that what the President is referring to when he says "military cooperation" is operations other than war. Peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, crises response, and other military missions are more and more the first tool used to provide nation assistance whenever possible. These missions are, on the surface, positive and make most Americans

feel good, but how they are received by the people in the country and region where the missions are performed, is not always clear.

Providing food for starving people is always well received, but sometimes the length of time it takes us to respond to the aid of suffering people is criticized and over shadows the humanitarian effort itself. Aid for people during natural or man made disaster is welcome, but why do we respond to some countries and not to others? When we give such large amounts of foreign aid to Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and Greece every year, Africa wonders why we were so slow to come to the aid of their unstable countries when they asked for our help.

In these areas our policy is not clear. It is particularly unclear to on-lookers who question our intentions and our lasting resolve. For example, although the peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia are going well, we are now confronted with the problem of what to do about convicted war criminals. No matter what resolutions are passed in the UN, no matter how much we say we want peace, to the peaceful citizens of that region, we are seen as unsuccessful if we permit criminals to openly defy the law. This perception will intensify especially if we pull out, claim success, and leave the criminals free to commit further crimes. To the people of that region this is an infected wound, a wound that is festering, and if not treated, could be fatal. It may well be that in their eyes, we have assisted the criminals and not the people who really need our help.

The President has taken huge steps in his Presidential Decision Directives (PDD)13 and especially 25 to make clear to our forces, Congress and the American people when, why, and how long, we will be involved in peacekeeping operations before we deploy. More difficult to predict however, is exactly what we will do when we get there initially, and what will be necessary when changes in the situation occur. Will it be charity or an investment?

First, we must make the hard choice initially based on the vital interest of the nation. There will be conflict in the world that is simply not our cause to solve. We must accept this fact!

Second, when providing assistance unilaterally, we must be willing to accept the will of the people. Our assistance must have no strings attached. If we need strings attached to our assistance, we have probably committed in error and should not invest!

Third, economic aid is the **key sign of our intentions** and must be spread among our allies based on the basis of **clear criteria** and a relationship between their need and our vital interest. We must understand there is no quick fix and that most of the problems requiring nation assistance will take a long-term investment.

Fourth, we must **reform the massive bureaucracy** and eliminate the duplication of effort between the many agencies providing assistance.

USAID should take the lead role and be given the authority to consolidate the nation assistance program outside of, but in coordination with the UN.

Each situation requires a comprehensive plan of attack; a tailor-made suit for the special needs of the individual. Our assistance will be more successful when we clearly define the problem we are trying to solve and use all of our resources to eliminate it. We must also accept the reality that conflict between some nations has lasted for hundreds and thousands of years. Thus, for them, there may be no peaceful solution.

I agree with Ralph Peters who states,

conflicts of the future will be asymmetrical, with a state or coalition of states as only one of the possible participants. In the past we have only fought other nations, legal-basis states. In the future, and the future is now, we are looking at rogue factions, large criminal organizations and independent actors who threaten our national security and vital interest around the world as enemies in future conflicts.

Peters believes one of the major reasons for armed conflict in the future will be the inability of nations-states to manage and distribute resources critical to the growth and development of the population. This is nothing more than the widening gap between the rich and the poor that causes political instability, friction between classes of people, cultures and sub-cultures leading to regional conflicts in all parts of the world.

In "Rethinking Operations Other Than War," Robert J. Bunker proposes that "The future killing fields will not be the remote

mountain areas where traditional guerrilla wars have been fought, but the crowded, built-up burgeoning urban areas is where the conflicts will take place." This is especially a problem because in most developing countries the same types of problems exist from one city to another in the same region of the country. Thus, what explodes in one city is likely to explode in another. This destabilizes the region and threatens the National Security of the United States.

LOOKING TO PROMOTE VALUES

Many educational and community organizations such as

Character Counts, The Character Education Institute, assert that
graduating intelligent, ethical citizens from high school is
their objective. Empowering and supporting adults to make caring,
mature, responsible decisions is the goal of Community Care and
several other leading community organizations having deep roots
in the foxholes of urban America where Americas' problems seem to
be magnified.

The very core of our Western value system is built on the Judeo-Christian ethic. Over the past 2,000 years, passed down from the Greeks, Romans and Jews, and the British, most of our beliefs and traditions have become law. We are truly a diverse assortment of people, the melting pot. Our pluralistic society is remarkably adept at deciding what is good for its citizens.

Through elections, we enact our representative form of government.

Today especially, and for most of this century, our prominence in the world political order, leadership in investment banking, computer technology, and our military power are unquestionably the best in the world. Yet for all this American ingenuity and power, our place in the world is finally determined by our values. When other nations of the world do business with Americans they do so with confidence of honesty and stability.

When world government bodies need humanitarian assistance, their number one choice is the American military, because the military can be trusted. Our value system lies at the heart of this trust. It is this foundation of trust and our leadership in the world that makes the nation assistance program a unique tool for shaping world opinion, developing friends and allies and spreading democracy into regions of the world looking for a new direction and prosperity.

Americans must look to the future; imagine what the world will look like and invest in nation assistance programs now where peace can be preserved and cultivated into democracies that are secure, strong and self-sufficient.

During the recent Presidential Select Reserve Call-ups, reserve units were mobilized for operation "Uphold Democracy" in Haiti and more than 5,000 Army reservist in units were mobilized to support Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In

addition, each year some 20,000 Army Reservists are deployed to support U. S. military operations in about 50 countries around the world. However, under the projections of the draw-down, the end strength of the Army Reserve will be 208,000 in FY99. Even at this strength, 45 percent of the Army's combat service support and 30 percent of the combat support missions are conducted by the reserves. Certain specialized USAR units such as civil affairs, public affairs, psychological operations, postal, medical and others are perfect for Nation assistance.

These units bring with them the unique sensitivity of the citizen soldier and come with the technical skills needed by the host nation. Oddly enough, the real battle is educating the American public, the employers of the reservist to the extent of the contribution made by the reservist to the execution of our national security strategy. This is why the need to have common values and to reach a consensus on our approach to nation assistance is the key to our NSS and how we are perceived around the world. Our Army is a 100 percent volunteer force, both active and reserve. Without the cooperation of the employers of the citizen soldier, our ability to perform the critical elements of Nation Assistance is in jeopardy.

An investment in Nation Assistance should only be made when there is political commitment by the host nation and when our involvement is part of a long term development plan. Short term, projects, must be classified as charity and must not be confused

with a commitment on our part to invest our time and resources long term without full participation and commitment of the host nation.

Our investment must include an approach that mobilizes and integrates all the elements of national power. Without public support and the will of the American people, the ability of the United States to influence world events (and not just to react to them) will be seriously threatened.

NSS AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC POWER

During the Cold War, military power was necessary to counter the expansion and threat of communism. Today, and in the foreseeable future, economic power and influence are more useful in maintaining our ability to shape world events than the brute force of our military. Military power is not only derived from the economic power of our nation but because of the links in our global economy, the opportunity to use force against non-state actors and rogues is becoming more and more difficult. If we do not pay more attention to the economic element of power, our ability to fulfill our global commitments and influence our allies and independent states will be limited to the western hemisphere at best.

NATIONAL POWER AND NATIONAL SECURITY

NSS is "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation state together with its armed forces during peace and war to serve national objectives. National Power is the strength or capacity that a sovereign nation-state can use to achieve its national interests. The ability of a state to control the behavior of others."¹²

Japan is the perfect example of how economic power is usable and sustainable without huge amounts of military power.

Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan all wield considerable world influence politically and economically because of their economic power. Even with the recent financial turmoil in the Asian markets, few of us believe the markets will collapse. Many investors are seeing this as an opportunity to get in while the market is under valued and make huge profits in a short period of time, realizing the importance of the Asian markets to the rest of the world, knowing we can not let it fail. Taiwan is the largest holder of U. S. dollars and has been able to enlist our full support in their political stand against China because they are one of our largest trading partners and are a vital branch of our economic health.

World War II saw the United States turn its full economic potential into one of the greatest military powers the world has

ever seen. On the other side of that coin, Hitler saw his great military come to a stop as the economic system of the nation could not continue to support his military industrial complex and assisted in his defeat. Historians call this phenomenon "imperial overstretch." 13

THE LIMITS OF MILITARY POWER AND OUR WILL TO USE IT.

Whether it concerned the removal of Castro from Cuba, Hussein from Iraq, or our inability to win the Vietnam War, in each of these situation our overwhelming military strength was not enough to meet our objectives. Some would say it was the political restrictions placed on the military and not the military itself which failed. Either way, the mission was not accomplished. The most common global threats to peace and stability, population growth, hunger, disease, unequal distribution of wealth, drug trafficking, inadequate infrastructure, lack of capital, and lack of basic services all require long-term economic solutions. These are solutions that can begin with nation assistance.

At the end of World War II the United States was the only source of capital able to rebuild Europe and Japan. By and large, we could dictate the behavior of our allies (British in 1956 over the Suez Canal, Japan and Germany throughout reconstruction) and, at least, contain our enemies. Today, we do not have the economic or political clout to stop the Russians or Poles from supplying

Iran, or even be assured of landing rights on our allies' territory during the 1983 Libya airstrikes.

Today we are in arrears to the UN and are reducing our commitments to international organizations we founded to promote stability. Our budget debate is not centered on how much more we will spend on R&D, infrastructure and education - the debate is only over slowing the growth of government subsidized consumption and how much to reduce spending on defense and foreign aid.

In diplomacy, economic and military matters, "As the gap between American pronouncements and the practical American ability to enforce them become more glaring - the defense of American interest will become measurably more difficult." The barriers to effective action may be complex, but the fact remains - we will not be able to maintain the status quo, militarily, economically, or diplomatically, without a continually improving economy.

There is a significant probability that we will see a collection of regional hegemonies (U.S., China, Germany, Iran, South Africa) established on economic-military foundations to the exclusion of any one global power. Nation assistance is the key instrument for investment in the future of these regions.

A NATIONAL ECONOMIC STRATEGY

There is ample evidence that national economic strategies, explicit and implicit, can be successfully developed and

implemented. The challenge is two fold - recognize the need for a formal economic strategy (not a plan or a policy) and develop one that meets our political, cultural, and economic requirements and constraints.

The National Economic Council (NEC) was created by President Clinton in January 1993. The mission of the NEC is to advise the President on domestic and international economic affairs and to coordinate economic policy. The NEC has been very effective but has primarily focused on domestic and short-term issues rather than international assistance and long-range plans. To be the economic instrument of power the President needs, the NEC must be closely linked to the NSC and jointly committed to establish goals and objectives together, seeking opportunities to invest in our security strategy by assisting emerging democracies along the road of economic stability. We will have to make tough decisions over the scope and depth of our international commitments. Should we always rush to the fight so soon? Is the safety of the world our responsibility? Can we afford to protect all of our national interests everywhere in the world against all of the threats? Up to the end of World War II, our national security was based primarily on economic power. During the Cold War, our focus shifted to military power and to stopping Communist expansionism. Our victory in the Cold War was a victory of political resolve and an economic system that was stronger and deeper than that of the USSR.

We now need an assessment of the economic power requirements for the future, an evaluation of our economic capabilities against those requirements and a long-term strategy to align the two as economic power is both a means and an end.

GUATEMALA

Nation Assistance has made significant inroads moving Guatemala to its present state of Democracy. Although the road was sometimes rocky and we were not as sensitive in all areas [political, economic, and cultural] as we should have been, the results have been impressive. Over the past 30 years, the United States has provided Nation Assistance to Guatemala with mixed results. In 1989 the Cold War ended and the United States took inventory of the military and the Nation Assistance budget with intentions of reducing both and providing a peace dividend to the American people. After 1990 the United States continued to provide Nation Assistance, but it required a Host Nation agreement of political and economic commitment with Guatemala to be self-reliant and to work on the long-term cause of state problems rather than short term relief. The United States required a move toward investment rather than continuing charity. Through the mobilization of key government agencies, nongovernment and private organizations, Guatemala has raised its standard of living, improved its market economy, and is practicing democracy as its primary form of government.

CINC SOUTHCOM has initiated humanitarian and civic assistance through joint training exercises assisting their military in becoming self-sufficient in disaster relief operations, and defining its official military role in a democratic society. These accomplishments were achieved peacefully, through Nation Assistance

NATION ASSISTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA: AN EXAMPLE

Since the 1960s large civic projects have promoted stability in Latin America strengthening the link between our economies and governments, and thus opening the window of opportunity for further cooperation. In the 1990s alone, some of the civic projects included building schools, medical facilities and a host of roads and bridges in several countries throughout the region. "Because of the good will created by actions not words, the Bolivian government accepted the recommendation of the American Engineers who provided nation assistance in the area of disaster relief to permit civilian control of their military operations." This step toward democracy was only possible because of our assistance, close cooperation with the host nation and the strengthening of their infrastructure with the ability to maintain it themselves.

According to Major General Max Baratz, Chief, Army Reserve, the U.S. Army reserve specialized support structure and experience in numerous domestic disasters makes them

exceptionally well suited to respond to disasters around the world. For example, "the 249th Prime Power Battalion has performed over 100 missions all over the world since 1995."16 Some of these missions include "Operation Uphold Democracy" in Haiti, and "Operation Safe Haven" Haitian migration and disaster relief in the Caribbean, to name a few. The reduction of assets in the DOD has reduced the amount of nation assistance that is possible to perform. Today we are able to perform less than 40 percent of the nation assistance exercises conducted in 1995. This puts more importance on the initial decision of what type of assistance we are going to provide, charity or investment? It means we are not going to be able to do as much for as many nations so the investment decisions become even more important. Any action that promotes internal security and economic viability lessens the chance that the U. S. armed forces will be ask to intervene. This resembles preventive medicine. With early use of the appropriate assistance on healthy people, fewer resources are needed later. Prevention is usually cheaper than a cure.

Security assistance is a down payment in pursuing a successful foreign policy. Security assistance allows us an inroad to the countries in the region. Like any negotiation, the U.S. must bring something to the table or the country will not call on us for assistance. The carrot we bring is nation assistance whether it is charity or investment. Good will among friends and allies strengthens our national security and promotes exchanges in all facets of society if we are consistent in our commitments.

Up to now we have discussed only the government's steps to provide nation assistance but we must not over-look the non-government organizations (NGO). These organizations provide tremendous assistance particularly religious organizations that have some structure and creditability in areas we might not otherwise be invited into right away.

Our NSS needs tools like nation assistance that act as confidence- building measures for the host nation and promotes good will among their neighbors. Combined exercises, joint training programs, security assistance, professional military and civilian education, humanitarian relief and civic action programs, and arms transfer policies are effective tools which can cement relations between countries. These low cost and profile actions are acts of prevention and promote democracy by improving the quality of life for people of the host nation.

POLICY, STRATEGY AND RESOURCES

National strategy is described as "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives." Our national policy is influenced by the capabilities and limitations of our strategy. However, strategies are the lines between intentions and

perceptions of officials with budget authority and the political system that allocates funds or restraints on those strategies.

Resources, or budgets, are necessary components as we attempt to reach a certain level of nation assistance. This is deceptive because of the different agencies involved in providing nation assistance, particularly the military that is called upon by the State Department for most of the deployed assistance around the world. As the Congress looks for the peace dividend and reduces the military based on no central super power threat, the effect on our ability to provide nation assistance is greatly diminished.

In a speech before congress warning them of the dangers of cutting the military too deep, former Senator Sam Nunn argues that: "Not only does budget data yield a useful picture of national security policy, but the formal rules for allocating resources (the budgeting system) may be viewed as a mechanism by which the administration can shape and manage the substance of that policy." Simply put, policy objectives are an end and resources are the means to that end. Generally a decision is made based on the threat or risk assessment to commit resources and what type of resources to commit.

A policy alternative may be defined as a hypothesis: if certain things are done, then others will follow. Objectives are established before the hypothesis is tested and can be compared to the consequences. However, without resources there can be no

objectives. A policy includes both means and ends or it is not a policy at all. It all begins with The National Security Strategy, which is top down and directed by both the executive and legislative branches. It mandates the initial guidance for the other parts of the process.

This policy must be realistic and reflect the fiscal climate of the country. Inherent in formulation must be attention to the balance between strategic, foreign, and domestic policy. It is here where the tough calls are made and the competing domestic programs fight for resources with the State Department and Congress and the president must decide who gets funded or in essence which policy will actually be policy.

This decision was easy during the cold war period based on the existance of a central threat. However, today the choices are much more uncertain and unclear. As the infrastructure of our major cities, schools, medical care and other necessities are costing more and working less, it is difficult for members of Congress to explain to their constituents that we are funding more nation assistance programs for developing nations when they are in dire need of development in their neighborhood. Charity and investment begin at home and then spread abroad.

Congress influences the policy-making process through its appropriation of funds, or by changing the President's budget disallowing or adding new programs and by focusing public attention on policy implications. In addition, Congress makes its

most important choices by choosing what not to consider.

Uncontrolability is a biased form of control. It is doubtful, however, whether Congress fully appreciates how its budget decisions impact strategic defense, and national policy.

The result of public interest or citizen impact is often a waste of money or what is commonly called "Pork." Members of Congress also do things for the local constituents in opposition to the national good. The delaying tactics used in the base closures to specifically keep workers on the payroll is but one example of how difficult it is to link policy to resources. Certainly the public interest is not served when these parochial concerns are either the only or the primary consideration. For example, when the Congress legislates a program which the Army neither wants nor needs in order to preserve jobs, it is clearly a waste of tax dollars, even if intended as absolutely the right thing for the local people.

It would appear that in different times, policy was dominant over resources and at other times resources drove policy. During the mobilization for the Gulf War, all the necessary resources were committed to combat the threat of aggression by Iraq. No doubt, Policy was the dominate force.

Today, we are in uncharted waters faced with many small threats and the danger of radical groups unbridled by the Soviet Union looking to be major players on the world stage and using weapons of mass destruction as their voice. However, because this

is new territory uncommon to the voting and paying public, committing resources to this seemingly small, and insignificant threat appears to be over-kill. After all, we have the best defense in the world already. Why do we need more? We need more because prevention is cheaper than cure. The first part of the cure is nation assistance. It is precisely in these areas where the State Department, National Command Authority, and the Congress sees the potential for progress to strengthen our NSS.

CAN WE AFFORD TO USE MILITARY ASSETS FOR NATION ASSISTANCE?

The draw-down period of the military has seen an increase in the number of commitments rather than the decrease that was anticipated. Nation Assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and humanitarian missions have created the busiest op-tempo in modern military history. Regional instabilities and the opportunity to influence the advancement of democracy in developing countries has essentially made assistance missions a very important part of our National Security Strategy. It is critical, however, to examine each of these missions and understand the impact their undertaking will have on the readiness of the military to respond to armed conflict around the world. How do we train our military forces, our war-fighters, to perform these delicate humanitarian missions? Truly, this is a huge leadership challenge, particularly due to the changing

nature of the same mission. For example, Haiti began as a punitive intrusion action, moved into a leverage action and ended up a humanitarian action. This is an enormous drain on time and resources and the ability to train a soldier for all of these missions under the current structure is not possible. So, to perform these types of missions, we usually turn to the reserves whenever possible.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger established six questions to ask before taking on a nation assistance project:

- 1. Commit only if our vital interest is at stake.
- If we commit, do so with all the resources necessary to win.
- 3. Participate only if there is a clear Political and military objective
- 4. Be ready to change the commitment if the objectives change
- 5. Only take on the commitments the congress and American people are willing to support.

Send U.S. forces only as a last resort. 19

In 1994 Secretary William Perry outlined four conditions under which we would support U.S. forces being involved in nation assistance:

- 1. If we face a natural or man-made catastrophe that dwarfs the ability of the normal relief agencies.
- 2. If the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to respond in the time necessary.
- 3. If the response requires resources unique to the military.
- 4. If there is a minimal risk to the lives of American troops. 20

Secretary Cohen has taken the position that, "Our forces are there to defend American vital interest and important interest, and not overindulging ourselves in employing them to humanitarian

and other types of operation."21 This statement is more protection than policy.

The GAO conducted an examination on the effect that involvement in peace operations had on military unit training, equipment and other factors. The report found combat skills eroded quickly when conducting missions other than training for war, with a recovery period between 3 and 6 months to regain the skills that were lost.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Before we consider the use of force we must examine three important factors. First, we must decide to make the hard choice based on the vital interest of the nation. There will be conflict in the world that is simply not ours to solve. We must accept this fact or be prepared to police the world.

Second, when acting unilaterally, we must be willing to except the will of the people. Our assistance must have no strings attached. If we need strings we have probably deployed in error. Third, economic aid is the first barometer of our intentions and must be spread among our allies based on clear criteria of our national interest, need, or charitable intentions. We must understand there is always the possibility of hard feelings surfacing from those who we permit to suffer we but, call them friend.

CONCLUSION

We are in the mist of a unique opportunity to bring peace to many regions of the developing world. It's in our national interest to take advantage of this opportunity and use our resources wisely and invest in the future of peace and stability. The concern of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that we are becoming mesmerized by our ability to successfully perform Operations other than war and are losing sight of our primary mission of fighting the nation's wars. If we are to participate, the Reserve components are ready and uniquely prepared with large concentrations of CSS units able to provide nation assistance when the nation's vital interest calls for action. Finally, each situation requires a comprehensive plan of attack; a tailor-made suit for the special needs of the individual country. Our assistance will be more successful when we clearly define the problem we are trying to solve and use all of our resources to eliminate it. We must also recognize and accept the divisions between nations in some regions have lasted for hundreds and thousands of years. In so doing we must realize that there are no quick fixes in these cases. If the decision is made to intervene we must be committed for investment and do so with all of the elements of national power. It must be a full commitment, coordinated by the State Department, led by USAID with participation of all of the needed government agencies and NGOs

to ensure success. We must be willing to accept setbacks and disappointments but we must be vigilant in our resolve to provide the cure and remain steadfast with the host nation to provide the road to economic growth, free market economies and a better standard of living for the population of the host nation. If the decision is made to provide charity, we must do it quickly with no promise of investment but a helping hand in time of need to eliminate suffering and hardship.

Nation Assistance as we know it, must be an investment!

Word Count 7427

ENDNOTES

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